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I. INTRODUCTION

[S]hould the melancholy case arise that the judges should give
their opinions to the jury against one of these fundamental [constitutional] principles, is a juror obliged to give his verdict generally, according to this direction, or even to find the fact specially, and submit the law to the court? Every man, of any feeling or conscience, will answer, no. It is not only his right, but
his duty, in that case, to find the verdict according to his own
best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct
opposition to the direction of the court.'

*
Jon P. McClanahan, Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Roger L. Gregory, United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; Adjunct Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.
I thank Richard Myers for his invaluable advice and mentoring throughout the preparation of this
Article.
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To a reader who is untrained in American legal history, the above passage might seem like it advocates a radical departure from the American legal
system as it has existed throughout history. Indeed, one of the basic tenets of
the modem jury system is that issues of law are reserved for the court, while
issues of fact are to be determined by the jury; 2 that there should be jury review
of the constitutionality of laws seems an almost unthinkable proposition today.
Yet, this passage was taken from the diary of John Adams and was written in
1771. 3 What happened to the Founders' conception of a powerful jury, poised
to decide not only questions of fact but also questions of law, and when called
on, to resist enforcing laws that they deemed to be unconstitutional?
The early American legal system was strongly influenced by its British
ancestry. Not only did the American legal system often directly adopt Britain's
substantive law and procedures,4 but it also developed its own legal constructs
in response to what many colonists believed was oppressive British control. 5 In
particular, the trial of John Peter Zenger became a rallying cry for the Revolution. 6 Zenger, who was charged with seditious libel for publishing statements
that were critical of British rule, was ultimately acquitted by a colonial jury,
despite the fact that the jury was only to determine whether Zenger had published the statements and not whether the statements themselves were seditious.7
In response to the colonial juries' increasing refusal to convict colonists of
crimes committed against the Crown, Britain eliminated the right to jury trials in
particular categories of cases or declared that the trials be conducted in England,
thus denying colonists the right to trial by a jury of their peers. 8 Given the British interference with the colonial judicial system, it is no surprise that the Decla2 JOHN ADAms, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
WITH A LwE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 254-55 (1850).
2

James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials,4 HARv. L. REv. 147, 147 (1890) (discuss-

ing the dichotomy between matters of law and fact). It is interesting to note that even though this
Article was written in 1890, it adheres to this strict division of labor between the judge and jury,
and dismisses any notion that the jury should decide questions of law not in accordance with the
court's direction. See id. at 170.
3
See 2 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 254-55.
4
See ROSCOE POUND, CRIPMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 77-116 (1930) (describing the development of British criminal law and its impact on the American colonies); Douglas G. Smith, The
Historicaland ConstitutionalContexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1996) (providing detailed comparisons between the British and American jury systems).
5
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 871-75 (1994) [hereinafter Brief History] (describing the role of
the jury in resisting British control through refusal to convict colonists accused of crimes against
the Crown and the subsequent limiting of the types of cases that could be heard by a colonial
jury).
6
Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury "The Judicial Oligarchy" Declares War on
Jury Nullification,46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 383 (2007).
7
Id. at 383-84.
8
Brief History,supra note 5, at 875.
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ration of Independence included among its grievances against King George I
that he had "deprive[ed] us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury." 9
The right to a jury trial, particularly in the case of criminal matters, continued to be of central importance in the drafting of both the Constitution l and
the Bill of Rights." Furthermore, all twelve states that had adopted state constitutions prior to the Constitutional Convention included a right to jury trial in
criminal matters as one of the rights granted to their citizens.' 2 Although the
Founders considered the right to a jury trial to be of the utmost importance to
American citizens, there was little guidance provided on how the right to jury
trial should be implemented; consequently, there was much variation among the
states in a litigant's right to a jury trial and the role of the jury in deciding
cases.' 3 Perhaps this omission was an intentional one, giving states the power to
implement the right to a jury trial in such a way that they deemed most appropriate.1 4 Yet, if the right to a jury trial is to be an effective one and not a mere
formalism, jurors must be given a minimum amount of power over deciding
particular types of cases.' 5 By examining the statements of the Founders and
their contemporaries around the time of the drafting of the Constitution, one can
begin to get a sense of the different functions that were to be carried out by the
jury, as a protector of the people against overreaching by the government,' 6 as a
participant in the democratic process, 17 and as a central figure in the administra9
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776); see also Brief History, supra
note 5, at 875 (suggesting the connection between the fight of the British and American colonists
over the role of jury and the inclusion of the deprivation of the right to trial by jury among the
grievances in the Declaration of Independence).
10
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."); see also Note, The Changing Role of the
Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 171 (1964) [hereinafter Changing Role] (indicating colonial opposition to the Federal Constitution because of its failure to guarantee the right
to trial by jury in civil matters).
1
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR'S BILL OF
RIGHTS] ("Indeed, the entire debate at the Philadelphia convention over whether to add a Bill of
Rights was triggered when George Mason picked up on a casual comment from another delegate
that 'no provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases."' (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 587 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1937) (1787))); see also
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 233-35 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR'S AMERICA'S
CONsTrruTiON] (discussing the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the failure to guarantee the right to jury trial for civil cases in the Constitution, prompting the swift passage of the Seventh Amendment).
12

Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrruTION 258, 269

(Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987).
13 Smith, supra note 4, at 422.
14
See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
15 See Parmenter, supra note 6, at 384.
16
AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 83.
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tion of justice.' 8 The right of the jury to decide questions of both law and fact
comports with these goals, and indeed the jury's right to decide questions of law
in criminal cases was widely accepted around the country from the time of the
passage of the Constitution until the middle of the 1800s. 1 9 In 1794, the United
States Supreme Court even acknowledged the power of juries to decide questions of law when it presided over the jury trial in Georgia v. Brailsford, explicitly including such language in its instructions to the jury.2 °
While the jury's right to decide questions of law was commonly accepted at this time, the right to jury review was not so favorably looked upon by
the courts, when that right was explicitly considered at all. 2' Nevertheless, some
courts did allow defense counsel to argue the unconstitutionality of a law to the
jury, confirming the view shared by some scholars that the jury was vested with
the right to refuse to follow a law if the law were deemed by the jury to be unconstitutional.22 While this concept is often conflated with the modem notion of
jury nullification, this right of jury review should be considered as distinct from
jury nullification, since the right to jury review would enable jurors to refuse to
follow a law if they found the law to be unconstitutional, while the latter would
enable them to refuse
to follow a law if they found the law or application of the
23
law to be unjust.
With the passage of time, mounting opposition arose to the recognition
of a jury's right to decide issues of law. 24 While this opposition was by no
means uniform across the country,25 the gradual denial of this right continued
until 1895, at which time the Supreme Court's decision in Sparfv. United States
effectively turned any hope for the right of the jury to decide issues of law into a
17

Id. at 94.

18

Id. at 96.

19
Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law: ConstitutionalEntitlement Versus Judicial
Interpretation,33 VAL. U. L. REv. 449,453-54 (1999).
20
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1, 3 (1794) (instructing the jury on its right to decide

questions of law as well as fact, even though acknowledging a court's better position in deciding
the law); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 449 (describing the jury instructions in Brailsford).
21
See David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: Modem-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the
Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 626-27 (2000) (arguing that jury review was uniformly denied by federal courts).
22
Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher'sStone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U.
COLO. L. REv. 175, 195-96 (1998).
23
AMAR'S BELL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98 & n.64 (distinguishing between jury review
and jury nullification).
24
See Changing Role, supra note 10 (detailing the progressive denial of the jury's right to
decide issues of law in Massachusetts as an example of such changes throughout the country);
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582 (1939) (describing the prevalence of the right of the jury to decide questions of law in the early 1800s and the
weakening of the right in various parts of the country).
25
See Smith, supra note 4, at 452 (indicating that as late as 1851, fifteen states acknowledged
the jury's right to decide issues of law by constitution, statute, or judicial decision).
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dead letter. The great divide between judges deciding issues of law and juries
deciding issues of fact was complete, and scholars tried to reconcile inconsistent
precedent and statements to the contrary.27
This Article argues that the Founders' conception of a strong, independent jury necessarily included the right of the jury to decide issues of law and
fact, as well as the related right to refuse to apply laws it deemed to be unconstitutional. During the course of the nineteenth century, the ideals of an active
jury, involved in the administration of justice, poised to defend against governmental overreaching, was replaced with the conception of a passive jury that
was only asked to dutifully decide disputed issues of fact. Justifications given
by legal scholars for this shift in practice, while appealing facially, are premised
on an idea that this shift was an inevitable response to the social changes in the
nineteenth century,28 but fail to fully acknowledge that the shift in practice itself
might have contributed to the failure to achieve the Founders' ideals of the jury.
It is important to note at the outset that this Article is intended to be primarily
descriptive in nature, detailing the role of the jury from the colonial American
era until the end of the nineteenth century. This Article does not purport to explore the normative question of whether the modem jury should have these
roles, leaving this topic for a subsequent article. Nevertheless, if one believes
that the Founders' conception of the jury should influence its modem formulation, this Article will help inform that discourse.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the evolution of the role of the
jury in Britain and its impact on the conception of the jury in colonial America,
focusing primarily on the right of the jury to decide issues of law. Moreover,
Part HI examines the tension between Britain and colonial America concerning
the administration of justice, and how this tension helped shape the Founders'
vision of the jury. Part Il of this Article examines the conception of the jury
around the time of the enactment of the Constitution and Bill of Rights through
statements of the Founding Fathers and other contemporaries, in order to develop an understanding of the different ideological roles that were to be fulfilled
by an inclusion of the right to a jury trial. In addition, Part III will examine how
the jury's right to decide issues of law and jury review fit within this ideological
framework., Part IV of this Article traces the erosion of the jury's right to decide
issues of law during the nineteenth century. This Article concludes by exploring

26

See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). For a more detailed review of the

Sparf case and criticism of its legal conclusions, see generally Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving
Thomas Jefferson's Jury: Sparf and Hanson v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
353 (2004).
27 See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 2, at 170-72 (attempting to reconcile the language of Georgia
v. Brailsford with the division of labor between the judge and jury by providing limited exceptions
to the rule governing the division of labor). But see Howe, supra note 24, at 583-84 (suggesting
that Thayer's vision of the division of labor between judge and jury does not comport with the
actual practices in the 1800s).
28
See, e.g., Howe, supra note 24, at 614-16; Brief History, supra note 5, at 915-20; Pepper,
supra note 21, at 639-40; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 408.
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proposed justifications for this erosion, but ultimately finds that such justifications are inconsistent with the Founders' conception of the jury.
EI. THE BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE EARLY AMERICAN RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY

This Part discusses the relationship between judges and juries in Britain,
and in particular the tight control that judges traditionally exercised over judicial
proceedings and jury verdicts. By the seventeenth century, British judges exerted considerably less control over juries. While the legal system in colonial
America was influenced by the growing independence of juries in Britain, it
went even further in giving juries the power to decide issues of law, independent
from judges.
A.

HistoricalEvolution of the Role of the Jury in Britain

A comprehensive treatment of the British jury system is beyond the
scope of this Article; 29 consequently, this Article will focus on the right of the
British jury to decide issues of law, as well as the evolution of judicial control
over the jury in reaching verdicts. Traditionally, there was a sharp division between the judge deciding issues of law and the jury deciding issues of fact.
Moreover, the judge had coercive measures at his disposal to ensure that the
jury's verdict was consistent with his wishes. Over time, however, British
courts began to recognize the need for an independent jury, which through the
rendering of a general verdict could decide issues of law.3°
British common-law courts traditionally adhered to a distinct division of
labor between judges deciding issues of law and juries determining issues of
fact,3 1 similar to that found in modem-day American courts. According to the
words of the British legal scholar Sir Edward Coke, "The most usual triall of
matters of fact is by twelve such men; for ad quaestionemfacti non respondent
judices; and matters in law the judges ought to decide and discusse; for ad
32 While
quaestionem juris non respondent juratores."
Coke's statement accurately described the general rule, there were exceptions, the most famous of
which appeared in the trials of John Lilburne.33 During his 1649 trial on charges
of treason for publishing anti-government pamphlets, Lilbume asked the court
29
30
31
32

For a detailed description of the British jury system, see generally Smith, supra note 4.
See id. at 416.
See Thayer, supra note 2, at 149.
SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, OR, A

COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 155b (18th ed. 1823).

33 See Steven M. Fernandes, Comment, Jury Nullification and Tort Reform in California:
Eviscerating the Power of the Civil Jury by Keeping Citizens Ignorant of the Law, 27 Sw. U. L.
REV.99, 100-05 (1997).
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to allow him to address the jury on issues of both law and fact. 4 In response,
the judge stated, "Master Lilbume quietly express yourself, and you do well; the
jury are judges of matter of fact altogether, and Judge Coke says so: But I tell
you the opinion of the Court, they are not judges of matter of law."35 Although
he was formally denied the opportunity to argue issues of law to the jury, Lilbume continued to advocate his right to do so in his closing statement, and ultimately he was found to be not guilty on the charge of treason. 36 In 1653, Lilburne faced a second trial, and again he advocated the jury's role in deciding
issues of law.37 In this trial, Lilbume went further, "invok[ing] the jury as a
shield, adjuring them to reject 'void' law and to act on behalf of the people,
whose powers of delegation of authority to true representatives had been wrongthe jury found that Lilbume was
fully usurped., 38 In its acquittal of Lilbume,
"not guilty of any crime worthy of death., 39
A closer inspection of Lilburne's writings and statements during his trials reveal that Lilbume was arguing for more than just a version of jury nullification as it is conceived in modem legal scholarship; instead, he was advocating
for the jury to decide pure issues of law as a judge and even engage in a type of
jury review. 4° In the 1649 trial, he advocated that the jury should be able to find
that the statute was "null and void under the true law of England.'" ' Furthermore, in the 1653 trial, he argued that the jury should be able to assess whether
a recently enacted statute was not in accordance with "due process" because the
statute imposed sanctions that did not previously exist under the common law.42
Beyond modem notions of failing to apply an unjust law, Lilbume was advocating a juror role similar to that of a judge, vested with the right to decide purely
legal issues as well as the right to decide whether a statute was repugnant to
Britain's unwritten constitution.43
In the British courts, judicial control over the proceeding and the jury
was initially quite strong, with the judge taking an inquisitorial role in questioning the witnesses and "compel[ling] jurors to reconsider decisions with which he
did not agree." 44 As time went on, direct methods of compelling jurors to re34

Id. at 100-0 1.

35

THOMAS ANDREw GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 173 (1985).

36

Id.; Pepper, supra note 21, at 611; see Parmenter, supra note 6, at 381.
Fernandes, supra note 33, at 102.
GREEN, supra note 35, at 197-98.

37
38

id. at 197.
See Pepper, supra note 21, at 611 (exploring what Lilburne meant when he stated that the
jury should decide issues of law). Unlike this Article, the author uses Lilburne's statements in the
context of jury nullification. See id.
41
GREEN, supra note 35, at 195.
39

40

42

Id. at 196.

Pepper, supra note 21, at 611.
Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedurein Eighteenth
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 505-06 (1990); see Smith, supra note 4, at 406-07.
43
44
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consider decisions were replaced with indirect, yet arguably equally coercive
measures. 45 Due to the fact that jurors were traditionally considered to be witnesses by the British courts, jurors could be found guilty of perjury for reaching
a "false" verdict. 46 Through the writ of attaint, the court would impanel a new
jury to review the verdict, and if the second jury found the verdict to be incorrect, "the members of the first jury were subject to imprisonment, forfeiture of
lands and chattels, and denial of credit to borrow money. 47
The coercive tactics of the judiciary towards the jury were limited as a
result of Bushell's Case, decided in 1670.48 Edward Bushell was a member of
the jury in the prosecution of Quakers William Penn and William Mead on
charges of preaching to an unlawful assembly and breach of the peace.49 After
twice refusing to follow the instructions of the court, which had instructed the
jury to return a guilty verdict on all charges, "[tihe judge admonished the jury,
threatening not to release them until they returned an acceptable verdict: 'you
shall be locked up, without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco ... we will have a
verdict, by the help of God, or you shall starve for it. ' ' 50 In fact, the judge detained the jury for two days without food, water, and heat, yet the jury did not
waiver in its decision.51 As a result of the jury's refusal to return a guilty verdict, the judge imposed a fine on the jurors and imprisoned those who refused to
pay the fine, including Bushell.52 Bushell filed a habeas corpus petition, and
Chief Justice Vaughan declared in Bushell's Case that judges could not fine or
imprison jurors for rendering a verdict with which the judge did not agree. 53 It
is interesting to note that Vaughan's reasoning was not based on the idea that
the jury had the right to decide issues of law; in fact, the opinion stated that a
juror is obligated to follow the law laid down by the judge.54 Nevertheless, the
"case established the independence of the English jury and cemented its position

See Robert Wilson, Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Application of
the Pickering Test, 18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 389, 394-95 (2008).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 395; see also James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development: III, 5 HARV. L. REv.
357, 364 (1892) (describing the procedure for the writ of attaint in further detail).
48
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670), available at http://www.constitution.org
/trials/bushell/bushell.htm.
49
Parmenter, supra note 6, at 381.
50
Id. (quoting Trial of Penn and Mead, in 6 COBBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS 951, 963 (1810)).
45

51

Id.

52

Smith, supra note 4, at 408.

Id.; The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1417 (1997); Parmenter, supra note 6, at 382.
See Simon Stem, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics:Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1815-16 (2002). But see
Parmenter, supra note 6, at 382 (finding that "Vaughan declared that the jury determines the law
in all matters decided by a general verdict.").
53
54
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as a guarantor of liberty in the face of state oppression. ' '55 Despite Vaughan's
language to the contrary, the case was soon viewed as generally supporting a
jury's right to decide both issues of law and fact.56
In addition to a few prominent cases where British courts considered the
right of the jury to decide issues of law and the related power of courts to coerce
jurors to issue particular verdicts, the very nature of a general verdict itself arguably gave juries a "de facto power" to decide issues of law.57 Although British courts could minimize the effect of enabling juries to decide issues of law
through procedural devices such as the special pleading and the special verdict,58 when such procedural devices were not employed, juries could effectively
decide issues of law through a general verdict. Moreover, after the decision in
Bushell's Case, such verdicts could be made without fear of retribution by the
59

court.

While British juries clearly did not have a recognized right to decide issues of law, by the seventeenth century they had gained more freedom to decide
cases in accordance with their own views of the law, independent from that of
judges.
B.

Tension between Britain and Colonial America Regarding Administration ofJustice

As the struggle between Britain and colonial America escalated in the
time leading up to the Revolution, colonial juries played a vital role in mounting
opposition to oppressive British control. 60 Not only were colonial American
jurors free of the extreme coercive judicial tactics that were once practiced in
Britain due to the result in Bushell's Case, but the colonies accorded judges
even less control over jurors than did their British counterparts. 61 Among the
greater powers given to colonial juries, the courts allowed lawyers to argue the
validity of laws to juries. 62 Colonial juries, equipped with this relatively unchecked power to render general verdicts, refused to convict defendants accused
Smith, supra note 4, at 408; see also Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of
the American Jury, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 377, 384 (1999) (discussing the impact of Bushell's Case
on the independence of the jury and the jury's role as a defender against governmental abuses).
56
Stem, supra note 54, at 1816.
55

Smith, supra note 4, at 416 (emphasis added).
58
See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-CenturyBackground of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence,76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 905-06 (1978) (describing some of the procedures
used in Britain that were not extensively used in the American colonies in the mid-eighteenth
century).
59
Smith, supra note 4, at 408.
60
Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the Bench and Bar, 173
MiL. L. REv. 68, 74 (2002); see also BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 871.
61
See Smith, supra note 4, at 439-41.
62
Huestis, supra note 60, at 74.
57
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of violating British laws, in particular those involving seditious libel 63 and trade
restrictions. 64 As an example of the colonial jury's influence on the administration of justice, in 1768 John Hancock refused to allow British customs inspectors aboard his ship, in clear violation of a statute requiring such access. 65 However, the attorney general thought it futile to prosecute the case because a colonial jury would refuse to indict or convict Hancock. 66 One of the governors of
Massachusetts lamented that "a trial by jury here is only trying one illicit trader
by his fellows, or at least by his well-wishers. ' 67
Undoubtedly, the most celebrated and influential case of a colonial jury
refusing to convict an accused despite the weight of evidence was that of John
Peter Zenger, a printer who was charged with seditious libel for criticizing the
governor of New York.68 Initially, the judge charged three separate grand juries
to indict Zenger for seditious libel, but all refused to do so; consequently, Zenger was charged by information. 69 When Zenger's original lawyers objected to
the chief justice presiding over the trial on grounds of lack of independence
since his service was at the will of the Crown, the chief justice not only refused
to disqualify himself but also had the lawyers disbarred. 70 Under the thenprevailing rules governing seditious libel prosecutions, the jury was not to determine whether a publication was libelous, for that was deemed a question of
law to be decided by the court. 1 Instead, the jury was only to determine
whether the defendant had published the materials that were the subject of the
charge.72 Furthermore, truth was not considered a defense to a libel prosecu-

63

See Brief History, supra note 5, at 874 ("Hundreds of defendants were convicted of [sedi-

tious libel] in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but there seem to have
been no more than a half-dozen prosecutions and only two convictions in America throughout the
colonial period.").
64
See Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice or an
Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 134 (1993) (noting that colonial juries refused to
convict defendants for violating navigation acts that were created to ensure that trade flowed
through Britain).
65
Huestis, supra note 60, at 74-75.
66

Id. at 75.

67

STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 57 (1983)

(quoting Governor Wil-

liam Shirley).
68
Brief History, supra note 5, at 871; Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal
Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 164 (1988). For a more detailed account of the Zenger case, see
generally Famous American Trials, John Peter Zenger Trial 1735, http://www.law.umkc.edu
/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/zenger.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
69
Harrington, supra note 55, at 393.
70
Brief History,supra note 5, at 872.
71 Pepper, supra note 21, at 614.
72
Parmenter, supra note 6, at 383.
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tion. 73 Andrew Hamilton, Zenger's attorney, conceded that Zenger had published the materials in question, but he nevertheless maintained that the jury
should determine whether the materials were libelous; 74 central to Hamilton's
argument was that the jury had a right to determine the law.75 The chief justice
disagreed with Hamilton, and the following exchange ensued:
Chief Justice: "[T]he jury may find that Zenger printed and
published those papers, and leave it to the Court to judge
whether they are libelous; you know this is very common; it is
in the nature of a special verdict, where the jury leave the matter
of law to the Court."
Hamilton: "I know ...the jury may do so; but I do likewise
know they may do otherwise. I know they have the right beyond
all dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where
they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so ....[L]eaving
it to the judgment of the Court whether the words are libelous
or not in effect renders juries useless.
,76
Hamilton, citing Bushell's Case as precedent, posited that "it is very
plain that the jury are by law at liberty ... to find both the law and the fact in
our case." 77 Hamilton argued for more jury involvement to combat a "widespread fear" that a judge's already vast powers were incompatible with a judge
also having the sole power to interpret laws. 78 Although the judge did not agree
with Hamilton's contentions, he did allow the jurors to return a general verdict,
and Zenger was acquitted. 79 An account of the Zenger trial was widely published throughout the80colonies, and it "became the American primer on the role
and duties of jurors.'
The Zenger trial has often been cited by scholars as a prime example of
the colonial jury's resistance to unpopular prosecutions by the British-controlled

Pepper, supra note 21, at 614; see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 873 ("The wellestablished rule was: The greater the truth, the greater the libel.").
74
Brief History, supra note 5, at 873.
75
Pepper, supra note 21, at 615.
76
Brief History, supra note 5, at 873 (quoting JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE
73

CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY

ley Katz ed., 1963)) (alteration and emphasis in original).
77
JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE
PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 92

JOURNAL 78 (Stan-

AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER,

(Stanley Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972); accord Huestis,

supra note 60, at 74.
78
Pepper, supra note 21, at 615.
79
Brief History, supra note 5, at 873.
8o
Id. at 874.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009

11

West Virginia Law
Review,
Vol. 111,
3 [2009], Art. 9
WEST
VIRGINIA
LAWIss.
REVIEW

[Vol. I111

government, 81 and indeed it is such a case. Proponents of jury nullification have
relied upon the Zenger case as support for the practice in colonial times, and the
two have almost become synonymous with each other.82 Taking a closer look at
Hamilton's arguments, however, reveals that his arguments for the jury deciding
issues of law were broader than merely advocating the jury's right to refuse to
uphold an unjust law.83 In particular, he argued to the jury that the court had
misinterpreted the elements of libel in the common law by failing to allow the
truth of the publication as a defense to the claim, using prior precedent and legislation in support of this contention. 4 Hamilton also made policy arguments to
the jury against the judge's interpretation of the elements of libel.85 Finally, he
called upon the jury to consider inherent legal rights accorded to colonial
Americans, stating that "[the] nature and the laws of our country have given us a
right-the liberty-both of exposing and opposing arbitrary power . . .by
speaking and writing truth., 86 Taken together, Hamilton's arguments to the jury
were similar to that which would be made to a judge faced with making a purely
legal interpretation of the elements of a crime--considering the common law
and past precedent, statutes that concern the subject, and public policy arguments in favor of a particular interpretation. In addition, even though this case
predated the Revolution and subsequent adoption of the Constitution, Hamilton's statement regarding the inherent liberty of colonists to oppose governmental power through truthful language can be seen as a precursor to arguments
regarding the constitutionality of the law of seditious libel. Consequently, Hamilton's statements could be read to advocate not only the jury deciding issues of
law, but also a rudimentary type of jury review.
Faced with increasingly hostile colonial juries, the British government
responded by limiting their ability to hear contentious cases.87 First, the British
expanded the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, which did not have juries, to allow the courts to hear cases involving revenue owed to the British.88 Under the
81

See, e.g., AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 84 (citing Zenger for the proposition

that "[c]olonial grand juries flexed their muscles to resist unpopular prosecutions."); Magliocca,
supra note 22, at 191 ("[T]he Zenger trial was but the first example of jury resistance to Imperial
authority, and soon revolutionary activists adapted [sic] colonial practice to fulfill the jury's potential as a mobilizer of constitutional change.").
82
See, e.g., Huestis, supra note 60, at 74 (describing the Zenger trial as one of the most famous trials of jury nullification); Parmenter, supra note 6,at 383-84 (indicating that the Zenger
trial popularized jury nullification in the time leading up to the Revolution); John T. Reed, Comment, Penn, Zenger and O.J.: Jury Nullification-Justice or the "Wacko-Fringe's" Attempt to
Further its Anti-Government Agenda?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (1996) (citing Zenger as an
example of jury nullification of oppressive colonial laws).
83
See Pepper, supra note 21, at 615-17.
84

See id. at 616.

85

Id.

96

ALEXANDER, supra note 77, at 99; Pepper, supra note 21, at 616.
See BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 875; Harrington, supra note 55, at 394-96.
Brief History,supra note 5, at 875.

87

88
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Administration of Justice Act of 1774, English officials charged with crimes
could be tried in England instead of the colonies, where they would have undoubtedly faced more hostile juries. 89 In addition, Parliament stated that colonists accused of treason would be tried in Britain instead of in America, effectively denying the accused the right to be tried by a jury of his peers. a° Edmund
Burke, a member of the House of Commons yet sympathetic towards the American colonies, described the unjustness of this practice: "[Birought hither in the
dungeon of a ship's hold ...he is vomited into a dungeon on land, loaded with
irons, unfurnished with money, unsupported by friends, three thousand miles
from all means of calling upon or confronting evidence .

...
91 Not surpris-

ingly, the attempts by the British to limit the role of the jury only escalated the
tensions between the British and the colonists,92 and these actions greatly contributed to the desire to fight for colonial independence.9 3
Thus, juries in colonial America had even more power than their British
counterparts to render verdicts in accordance with their own views of the law.
Colonial jurists sometimes used this power to rebel against oppressive British
control, with the Zenger trial being the most notable example. British attempts
to curtail this power only heightened the already considerable tension between
themselves and the colonists, and it ultimately played a part in the American
revolution.
1II. FOUNDERS' CONCEPTION OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

This part analyzes the right to trial by jury as it was envisioned by the
Founders. In particular, the Founders staunchly believed that juries played an
essential role in the success of a democracy, by protecting against governmental
overreaching, by enabling citizens to participate in the democratic process, and
by operating as a central figure in the administration of justice. The right to
decide issues of law and the related right to decide the constitutionality of laws
fit in with the Founders' conception of the jury, as evidenced by the writings of
the Founders and the actual practices at that time.

Harrington, supra note 55, at 394.
See id. at 394.
91
2 EDMUND BURKE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 189, 192 (9th ed. 1889).
89
90

92

Harrington, supra note 55, at 395-96.

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20-21 (U.S. 1776) (listing among the grievances against King George III"depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury" and
"transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences."); see also Smith, supra note 4, at
424 (describing several actions leading up to the Declaration of Independence that indicated colonists' anger over the deprivation of the right to trial by jury).
93
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PrevailingTheories on the Nature of the Right to Trial by Jury

The right to trial by jury held a central place in the Founding Fathers'
vision of an ideal democratic society, with the right to trial by jury in criminal
cases protected by the Constitution 94 and Sixth Amendment, 95 and the right to
trial by jury in civil cases protected by the Seventh Amendment. 96 During the
Constitutional Convention, the protection of the right to trial by jury had widespread support among both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, as evidenced by
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 83:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the [Constitutional]
[C]onvention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the
value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference
between them it consists of this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government. 97
Elbridge Gerry, a staunch advocate of jury rights, declared that "the jury
was 'adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other [system] the world
can produce.'98
Given the great importance the Founders put on securing the right to
trial by jury, it might seem odd that the specifics of the right were not well delineated in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights, 99 and indeed the implementation of the right varied throughout the country.'0° Such flexibility may well
have been by design; according to Alexander Hamilton, "It would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any general regulation [on the right to trial
U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment;
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed....").
95
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed .... ).
96
U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.").
97
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 871.
But see Harrington, supra note 55, at 398-99 (suggesting that the Founders may have become
wary of the power of the jury).
98
Changing Role, supra note 10, at 171-72 (quoting Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New
94

Constitution, in 2 THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONsTrruTIONAL PAPERS 714, 720 (E.H. Scott ed.,

1894)).
99
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; U.S. CONST. amend VI; U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 3; THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20-21 (U.S. 1776).

100

Howe, supra note24, at 596-98 and nn.57-58.
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by jury] that would be acceptable to all the States in the Union, or that would
perfectly quadrate with the several State institutions." 10 1 Nevertheless, if a jury
is to be a "safeguard to liberty" or the "palladium of free government" as the
Founders so intended,' °2 one must endeavor to understand the Founders' conception of the jury, so that the jury is equipped with the powers necessary to
carry out this vision. Among the most important functions of the jury are as
protector against government overreaching, as an essential participant in democracy, and as a central figure in the judicial system. 103
Given the prominent role of juries in colonial America in cases such as
the trial of John Peter Zenger and other instances in which juries used their
powers of indictment and rendering verdicts to rebel against British control, the
Founders conceived of the jury as a "bulwark against the unjust use of governmental power." 1°4 Writings and statements by the Founders and their contemporaries provide the best evidence of how wide-spread this conception of the jury
was among the Founders, irrespective of other political differences. Alexander
Hamilton, a leading Federalist, wrote that "[alrbitrary impeachments, arbitrary
methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon
arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of
judicial despotism" and that the right to trial by jury in criminal cases operates
as a check on these arbitrary government actions. 10 5 In response to complaints
that the then-proposed Constitution did not contain provisions protecting the
right to jury trial in civil cases, Theophilus Parsons, a Federalist, stated that
[t]he people themselves have it in their power effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms. An
act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man
may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a
criminal by the general government; yet only his fellow citizens
can convict him; They are his jury, and if they pronounce him
innocent, not all the powers of congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce 6 him, if the supposed law he
resisted was an act of usurpation.'
The Anti-Federalists were likewise concerned about the abuses of governmental power, and even moreso than the Federalists, they advocated for more
101 THIE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
102 See id.
103

See generally AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 83-110 (describing the multi-

faceted roles of the jury in early America).
i4 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172; see also PouND, supra note 4,at 115; discussion
supra Part H.B.
105
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
106
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 144 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES

(Deb. 94)).
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explicit protections of the jury in the Constitution.' °7 According to an AntiFederalist pamphlet, "[j]udges, unincumbered [sic] by juries, have been ever
found much better friends to government than to the people. Such judges will
always be more desirable than juries to... those who wish to enslave the people
....
9108 The Anti-Federalists felt so strongly about the jury's protective role
that they threatened to block ratification of the Constitution if the right was not
expressly included. 1°9 Summing up his personal views on the meaning of the
right to trial by jury, Thomas Jefferson declared that "I consider [trial by jury] as
the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of its constitution."'110
In addition to the Founders' conception of the jury as a protector against
government oppression, the jury was viewed more generally as an outlet for
participation in the fledgling democratic government."' Again, the words of the
Founders themselves provide the best insight into this role. Thomas Jefferson,
considering the citizens' participation in government, wrote that "[w]ere I called
upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative. ' 12 According to Herbert J. Storing, a historian of Anti-Federalists, "The
question was not fundamentally whether the lack of an adequate provision for
jury trial would weaken a traditional bulwark of individual rights (although that
was also involved), but whether it would fatally weaken the role of the people in
107

See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh

Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 146-50 (1991).
108

Essays of An Old Whig (VIII), in 3 THE COMPLETE

ANTI-FEDERALIST

49 (Herbert J. Storing

ed., University of Chicago Press 1981).
109
Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L.
79 (2005). William Blackstone, a contemporary of the Anti-Federalists, wrote that
[t]he impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and
our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely entrusted
to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the
prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in
spight [sic] of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary
bias toward those of their own rank and dignity : it is not to be expected from
human nature that the few should always be attentive to the interests and good
of the many.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (16th ed. 1825); see
White, supra at 134.
110 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed.,
Taylor & Maury 1853); see William V. Dorsaneo, II, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54
SMU L. REv. 1695, 1696 (2001).
II See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 94.
112

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbd Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15

THE PAPERS OF

282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). John Adams echoed Jefferson's sentiment that citizens should be involved in the democratic process through serving on juries, writing
that "the common people, should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every
judgment of a court of judicature" as in the legislature. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 253.
THOMAS JEFFERSON
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the administrationof government."' 1 3 The early American jury may in fact
have fulfilled this role; Alexis de Tocqueville, describing a visit to America,
called the jury "first and foremost a political institution" 1H4 and "a form of popular sovereignty."' 15
What were the Founders' reasons for ensuring that citizens had the opportunity to participate in government through serving on the jury? Legal scholars have suggested several theories, which include benefits to the citizens themselves, as well as benefits to the government as a whole." 6 First, service on a
jury enables jurors to learn more about their legal rights, ultimately teaching
them to function more effectively as citizens in a democratic society." 7 According to the Federal Farmer, service on a jury was the "means by which the people
are let into the knowledge of public affairs-are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those
who otherwise might infringe upon them."' " 8 Alexis de Tocqueville described
this function of jury service in America, noting that "the jury.., is also the most
effective means of teaching the people how to rule."' 19 In this way, the right to
jury trial can be seen not only as an individual right accorded to litigants, but
also as a valuable legal institution benefiting jurors themselves. 20
In addition to the role that service on a jury plays in teaching citizens
about democracy and their legal rights, the jury also can be seen as an integral
part of the judicial branch, in what has been termed by the constitutional theorist
John Taylor of Caroline as the "lower judicial bench" in a bicameral judiciary.121 Such a formulation of the judicial branch is appealing given the checksand-balances that are prevalent throughout the branches of government, in particular the bicameralism found in the legislative branch. 122 Anti-Federalist writ113

HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19 (1981).

114

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

313 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., The

Library of America 2004) (1835).
115

Id. at 315.

116

See, e.g., AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 93-96 (jurors as students of the law and

as lower branch in bicameral judiciary); Brief History, supra note 5, at 876 (jurors as students of
the law); Scheiner, supra note 107, at 153-56 (jurors as last redoubt of self-government); Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 387-88 (jurors as part of lower branch in bicameral judiciary).
117
See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 93-94.
118
Letters From The Federal Fanner,in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 320 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter FederalFanner]; see also Scheiner, supra note 107, at 154.
119
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 114, at 318; see also AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11,
at 93 (using de Tocqueville's descriptions of the American juror as evidence of the role of juror as
student).
120 See Scheiner, supra note 107, at 155 (describing the "empowering and enabling" functions
of jury service).
121

JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

UNIrED STATES 209 (Yale Univ. Press 1950) (1814); AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at
95; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 387.
122
See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 95.
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ings from that time confirm that some Founders shared this conception of the
jury. 123 Furthermore, the arguments made by Andrew Hamilton in the trial of
John Peter Zenger illustrate this role of the jury in action; Hamilton called upon
the jurors to make purely legal determinations similar to those made by a judge,
and to further provide a check on the judge's legal determinations.' 24 Given the
wide publicity of Zenger's trial, 125 these arguments no doubt influenced the
Founders' conception of the proper role of the jury.
In carrying out its functions as a protector against governmental overreaching and as a participant in the democratic processes, the jury was conceived by the Founders to be a central figure in the administration of justice. 26
Not only were the rights to jury trials guaranteed through the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights, but the right to jury trials in criminal cases was also
widely guaranteed by the states in their own constitutions enacted prior to the
Constitutional Convention. 127 In fact, all of the original states preserved the
right to jury trials in civil cases through constitutional provision, statute, or by
judicial decision.128 The Federal Farmer declared that "[t]he jury trial... is by
far the most important feature in the judicial department in a free country...
,,129 In addition, the influence of the jury extended outside the courtroom and
into the society at large. 130 Alexis de Tocqueville described the unique role of
the jury thusly: "It would be a very narrow view to look upon the jury as a mere
judicial institution; for however great its influence may be upon13 the decisions of
the courts, it is still greater on the destinies of society at large."' '
B.

The Founders' Conception of the Right of the Jury to Decide Issues of
Law

At the time of the Founding, it was almost universally accepted that juries in criminal cases had the right to decide issues of law; in addition, juries

123

See, e.g., Essays by a Farmer (IV), in 5 THE

COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST

38 (Herbert J.

Storing ed., 1981) (describing the jury as "the democratic branch of the judicial power more necessary than representatives in the legislature."); FederalFarmer,supra note 118, at 320 (declaring
that through juries "drawn from the body of the people ... we secure to the people at large, their
just and rightful control [sic] in the judicial department.").
124
See discussion supra Part II.B.
12
See Brief History,supra note 5, at 873-74.
126

See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 96-98.

See Levy, supra note 12, at 269.
128
Smith, supra note 4, at 423-24.
129
FederalFarmer,supra note 118, at 320.
130
Smith, supra note 4, at 421-22.
131
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY
1956) (1835).
127

IN AMERICA
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generally decided issues of law in civil cases during this time. 32 Often, these
rights were codified in state constitutions or statutes, or were accorded in judicial decisions. 33 A contemporary dictionary even recognized this right in the
context of criminal cases in its definition of the word "jury," stating that juries,
"consisting usually of twelve men, attend courts to try matters of fact in civil
134
causes, and to decide both the law and the facts in criminal prosecutions."'
Several scholars who have examined the jury's right to decide issues of
law in early America have theorized that this right developed more as a result of
practical considerations instead of strongly-held philosophical beliefs about the
role of the jury. 135 Unlike judges in England, most judges in America had little
formal legal training; 136 American judges were often administrative or legislative officials or other prominent members of the local community.'37 In Rhode
Island, for instance, knowledge of the law was not a requirement for holding a
judicial office. 38 In fact, judges in Rhode Island apparently did not issue jury
instructions until 1833.39 Judges in Rhode Island "held office not for the purpose of deciding causes, for the jury decided all questions of law and fact; but
merely to preserve order, and see that the parties had a fair chance with the
jury."'14 Given that jurors were often as knowledgeable as judges regarding
issues of law, it may
have been natural for jurors to decide both issues of law
14 1
and fact in a case.
132

R.J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-TheirRole in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194,

202 (1932); Smith, supra note 4, at 446-47; Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172-73.
133
See Smith, supra note 4, at 446-48 and n.300-02 (providing examples of state constitutions
and statutes adopted around the time of the Revolution that guaranteed the jury's right to decide
issues of law).
134
NOAH WEBSTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828); Clay S. Conrad,
Jury Nullification as a Defense Strategy, 2 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 6 (1995). Another legal
dictionary widely used in colonial Virginia stated that "(i]f a jury take upon them the knowledge
of the law, and give a general verdict, it is good; but in cases of difficulty, it is best and safest to
find the special matter, and to leave it to the judges to determine what is the law upon the fact."
JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782).
135
See, e.g., Brief History, supra note 5, at 903-06 (suggesting that the jury's role in deciding
issues of law arose due to the lack of judges who were educated in the law); Harrington, supra
note 55, at 378-79 (citing the lack of formal legal training of judges as a contributing factor to the
power of the jury); WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 28-30 (Univ. of Ga Press

1994) (1975) (describing how the Massachusetts judicial system itself contributed to the jury's
role in deciding issues of law in Massachusetts courts).
136
See Brief History, supra note 5, at 903-05 (describing the lack of formal legal training
among judges in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and New Hampshire).
137
Harrington, supra note 55, at 378.
138
Amasa M. Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE L.J.
148, 153-54 (1905).
139
BriefHistory, supranote 5, at 904.
140

Howe, supra note 24, at 591 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

141

See Harrington, supra note 55, at 378-79; Brief History,supra note 5, at 904.
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Along with the relative lack of formal legal training among judges,
some of the early American court systems themselves may have given juries the
de facto power to decide issues of law. One of the most prominent of these systems was that of Massachusetts, which held trials before at least three judges
who would each give their own opinions concerning the law in the jury instructions.142 When the judges' opinions conflicted with one another, the jury was
free to decide which of the opinions to follow.143 Professor William E. Nelson
concluded from the structure of this system that juries in Massachusetts had
virtually unlimited authority to decide the law.144 Even judges in other jurisdictions made it clear that their interpretation of the law was not binding upon the
jurors. 145
Based on the aforementioned circumstances, one might conclude that
the jury's right to decide issues of law arose solely from considerations of practicality, and thus the right should not be considered an integral part of the Founders' conception of the jury. On the contrary, even though the jury's right 146
to
decide issues of law "may have arisen from haphazard practice at the time,"
by the time of the Revolution the right to decide issues of law was central to the
jury's role in society. As defense counsel in the case of People v. Croswell,147
Alexander Hamilton argued that
it is not only the province of the jury, in all criminal cases, to
judge of the intent with which the act was done, as being parcel
of the fact; they are also authorized to judge of the law as connected with the fact.... In England, trial by jury has always
been cherished, as the great security of the subject against the
oppression of government; but it never could have been a solid
refuge and security,148unless the jury had the right to judge of the
intent and the law.
Hamilton further stated that the jury should make legal determinations based not
only upon the judge's opinion, but also upon arguments of counsel and "law
authorities that are read," suggesting that the jury should have an active, independent role in deciding issues of law. 149 These arguments indicate that Hamil142

NELSON,

supra note 135, at 26.

143

Id.
144 Id. at 28; see also Smith, supra note 4, at 448.
145 Harrington, supra note 55, at 379; see Robert L. Jones, Finishinga Friendly Argument: The

Jury and the HistoricalOrigins of Diversity Jurisdiction,82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 997, 1031 (2007).
146 See BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 906.
147 3 Johns Cas. 337, 362 (N.Y. 1804) (emphasis in original).
148

Id.

149

Id.
(The jury ought, undoubtedly, to pay every respectful regard to the opinion of
the court; but suppose a trial in a capital case, and the jury are satisfied from
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ton viewed the jury's right to decide issues of law to be of much more significance than considerations of practicality and convenience, for he directly linked
the jury's right to decide issues of law to the role of the jury in protecting
against governmental overreaching. His statements further indicate that he believed that the right included making pure legal determinations, and not just
refusing to apply an unjust law.
Like Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson recognized the right of jurors to decide issues of law under circumstances in which there could be the potential for
governmental or judicial oppression. In Notes on the State of Virginia, he
wrote:
[I]t is usual for the jurors to decide the fact, and to refer the law
arising on it to the decision of the judges. But this division of
the subject lies with their discretion only. And if the question
relate to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in
which the judges may be suspected
of bias, the jury undertake
150
to decide both law and fact.
This passage also suggests that Jefferson viewed the right to decide issues of
law as essential to the jury's role as a "bulwark of liberty."' 51
James Wilson, an extensive contributor to the Constitution, also confirmed the right of the jury to decide issues of law when he wrote:
Suppose that, after all the precautions taken to avoid it, a difference of sentiment takes place between the judges and the jury
with regard to a point of law ....
What must the jury to do? The
jury must do their duty and52their whole duty. They must decide
the law as well as the fact.
Wilson's writings reveal that his conception of the jury's role in deciding issues
of law was similar to the idea that the jury was to act like the lower branch in a
bicameral judiciary, empowered to decide issues of law in a similar manner as a

the arguments of counsel, the law authorities that are read, and their own
judgment, ....
that the law arising in the case is different from that which the
court advances, are they not bound by their oaths, by their duty to their creator
and themselves, to pronounce according to their own convictions?)
Id.; see also Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 375 (discussing People v. Croswell and Hamilton's
arguments to the jury).
150 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1781-1782), reprintedin WRITINGS:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS, ADDRESSES,

LETTERS, at 256 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1781-1782).
151 Harrington, supra note 55, at 388.
152 JAMES WILSON, 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 540 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., Harv.
Univ. Press 1967); accord Pepper, supra note 21, at 617-18.
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judge.' 53 Wilson wrote that juries "must determine [legal] questions, as judges
must determine them, according to law."' 54 Wilson clarified the types of
sources that should be relied upon by juries in making decisions, stating that
"law, particularly the common law, is governed by precedents, and customs, and
authorities, and maxims: those precedents, and customs, and authorities, and
maxims are alike obligatory upon jurors as upon judges, in deciding questions of
law."' 155 While other Founders recognized that the jury's right to decide issues
of law furthered its role as a protector of the people against governmental overof law with its role
reaching, Wilson associated the jury's right to decide issues
56
as a central participant in the administration of justice.
John Adams, a vigorous proponent of the jury's right to decide issues of
law, arguably went further in his writings than did other Founders, for his writ157
ings overtly recognized the jury's right to decide the constitutionality of laws.
According to Adams,
[t]he general rules of law and common regulations of society,
under which ordinary transactions arrange themselves, are well
enough known to ordinary jurors. The great principles of the
constitution are intimately known; they are sensibly felt by
in
every Briton; it is scarcely extravagant to say they
58 are drawn
and imbibed with the nurse's milk and first air.'
If a judge made a ruling that violated one of these fundamental constitutional
principles, Adams believed that a juror had a duty "to find the verdict according
to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court."' 159 Scholars commenting upon Adams' writings have associated them with the now-defunct "natural rights" theory-the
theory that there was a natural law independent of positive law developed by
society, and that the natural law should be used as the preferred source of law
when the two conflicted.' 6° While his writings do share similarities with the
natural rights theory, they are distinguishable in that Adams focused on the jurors' understanding of the positive law and constitutional principles, rather than
153 See WILSON,supra note 152, at 542.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156

See Pepper, supra note 21, at 617-18.

157 See ADAMS, supra note 1, at 254-55.
158
159

Id. at 255.
Id. at 254-55; see also id. at 254 ("Therefore, the jury have a power of deciding an issue

upon a general verdict. And, if they have, is it not an absurdity to suppose that the law would
oblige them to find a verdict according to the direction of the court, against their own opinion,
judgment, and conscience?").
16o See, e.g., Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172. See generally POUND, supra note 4, at 12932 (describing the natural rights theory and its effect on the philosophy ofjury verdicts).
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calling upon
jurors to render verdicts based solely on their conception of a "nat16 1
ural law."'
Adams' conception of the jury having the right to decide the constitutionality of laws was not just theoretically plausible, it was in fact happening in
colonial America prior to the Revolution. Henry Hulton, the British revenue
commissioner, asked how his men could perform their duties "before a Jury of
the People [who] had held the very Laws under which the officers acted, to be
Unconstitutional."' 162 Moreover, as noted in Part ll.B, Andrew Hamilton had
advocated a form of jury review in the Zenger case itself. Given the statements
regarding the role of the jury from Founders such as Thomas Jefferson, who
considered a jury trial "the only anchor... by which a government can be held
to the principles of its constitution,"1 63 it appears that many Founders considered
the right to jury review as necessary to ensure that the jury would be able to
execute its roles as a protector against governmental overreaching and as an
independent actor in the judicial system.
Even assuming that the jury's right to decide issues of law arose out of
conditions in colonial America, the Founders seemingly integrated that right
into their conception of the jury's roles in American society-as a protector
against governmental overreaching, as a participant in the democratic process,
and as a central figure in the administration of justice. Arguably, the Founders
also considered the jury's right to decide the constitutionality of laws as essential to fulfilling these roles.
IV. EROSION OF THE JURY'S RIGHT TO DECIDE ISSUES OF LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

This Part first details the recognition of the jury's right to decide issues
of law immediately following the Revolution and continuing into the early part
of the nineteenth century. While there was no uniformity among the federal
courts and the states, the right to decide issues of law was accepted as commonplace, and the right to decide the constitutionality of laws was at least somewhat
implicitly accepted. In the 1830s, courts began narrowing the role of the jury in
deciding issues of law, which culminated in the 1895 decision in Sparf v. United
States. Accordingly, by the end of the nineteenth century, juries no longer had
the right to decide issues of law, and, to the extent that juries ever had the right
to decide the constitutionality of laws, that right was completely foreclosed.

161

See Pepper, supra note 21, at 618 (suggesting that Adams' use of the term "conscience"

should be interpreted in the context of making legal determinations and not interpreted more
broadly).
162
JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN A REBELLIOUS SPIRIT 34 (1979); Magliocca, supra note 22, at 194.
163

3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed.,

1861).
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Early Recognition of the Right to Decide Issues of Law

If there was any doubt about whether the jury's right to decide issues of
law had survived the American Revolution, such doubt was promptly laid to rest
in the 1794 case of Georgia v. Brailsford,164 a civil trial in which the United
States Supreme Court had original jurisdiction. 165 The case involved a dispute
between the state of Georgia and a British subject regarding which party was
legally entitled to an outstanding debt. 166 The facts of the case were agreed
upon by the parties, leaving the jury to decide the case based on its determination of the law. 167 In Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury, he first gave the
jury the unanimous opinion of the Court regarding the legal issues raised in the
case. 168 Rather than directing the jury to base its decision solely on the opinion
of the Court, Chief Justice Jay continued:
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the
good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the
jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have
nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both,
and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On
this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt,
you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the
court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the
best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the
court[s] are the best judges of law. But69 still both objects are
lawfully, within your power of decision.'
During deliberations, the jury returned to ask the Court to advise the
jury further on two purely legal questions. 170 After receiving explanations on
these two issues, the jury
rendered a verdict that was consistent with the Court's
171
opinion on the matter.
While many scholars have relied upon Georgia v. Brailsford in support
of the proposition that the jury's right to decide issues of law was widely ac3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3 (1794); see Pepper, supra note 21, at 620 (providing an analysis of
Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury regarding its right to decide issues of law and fact).
165
Jones, supra note 145, at 1035-36.
164

167

Brailsford,3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 1.
Id. at 4.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

170

Id.

166

1'
See id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/9
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cepted at this time,

some scholars have downplayed its significance. 173

In

particular, scholars suggesting that the jury's right to decide law should be more
narrowly construed have relied upon Chief Justice Jay's instructions to the jury
that the court is best equipped to decide questions of law and that the jury
should respect the court's opinion as to these matters, going so far as to suggest
that the Court was effectively giving a directed verdict in the case.1 74 Scholars
have pointed out that the jury actually sought advice from the Court on legal
issues and ultimately heeded the Court's opinions, further giving credence to the
idea that the jury did not decide issues of law for itself. 75 While these contentions have appeal at first blush, they seem to confuse the existence of the right
of the jury to decide issues of law with how that right was exercised in the particular case before the Court. It is true that the Court gave its opinion on the
legal issues in the case; however, it also recognized that the final determination
of the issues of law and issues of fact were "lawfully[] within [the jury's] power
of decision."1 7 6 Although the jury sought the advice of the Court regarding several legal issues, this action was consistent with the notion that the jury should
make its determinations based on an informed understanding of the law. 177 The
fact that the jury ultimately followed the Court's opinion does not diminish its
right to decide issues of law contrary to that of the court in other circumstances;
rather, it only shows that such a departure was not warranted in this case.
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address the role of the jury
in deciding issues of law for the next century, 78 lower federal courts continued
to recognize the right, including decisions involving Supreme Court Justices
who were riding the circuit. 179 For example, in Henfield's Case, 80 Justice Wilson first instructed the jury regarding the significance of its decision, stating that
"[lhis is, gentlemen of the jury, a case of the first importance. Upon your verdict the interests of four millions of your fellow-citizens may be said to depend.
But whatever be the consequence, it is your duty, it is our duty, to do only what

172

See, e.g., Changing Role, supra note 10, at 173-74; Brief History, supra note 5, at 907;

Jones, supra note 145, at 1035-36; Farley, supra note 132, at 232.
173
See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article Ii Jury, 87 VA. L. REv. 587,
626-29 (2001); Pepper, supra note 21, at 620-21.
174
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 173, at 628-29.
175
Pepper, supra note 21, at 621.
176 Georgia v. Brailsford, U.S. (3 Dali.) 1, 4 (1794).
177 See WILSON, supra note 152, at 540-42; discussion supra Part III.B.
178

Nevertheless, in Bingham v. Cabot, Justice Iredell reaffirmed the right of the jury to decide

issues of law contrary to the court's opinion, asserting that "though the jury will generally respect
the sentiments of the court on points of law, they are not bound to deliver a verdict conformably to
them." Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 33 (1795).
179 Pepper, supra note 21, at 621. For an extensive listing of cases in which Supreme Court
Justices reaffirmed the law-finding function of juries, see Howe, supra note 24, at 589 n.22.
180
Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C. Pa. 1793).
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is right."'18 1 After explaining the court's interpretation of the law to the jury,
Justice Wilson concluded by stating "that the jury, in a general verdict, must
decide both law and fact, but that this did not authorize them to decide it as they
pleased; they were as much bound to decide by law as the judges: the responsibility was equal upon both." 182 In the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief
Justice Marshall declared in his jury instructions that "[t]he jury have now heard
the opinions of the court on the law of the case. They will apply that law to the
facts and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may
direct." 183 These jury instructions support the proposition that federal courts
continued to recognize the jury's right to decide issues of law in the early nineteenth century. Although the jury's right to decide questions of law was not
uniform throughout the states, evidence suggests that this right was widely accepted in the first half of the nineteenth century. 184 By 1851, at least nine states
had given juries the right to decide issues of law through constitutional provision or statute, and at least six other states had recognized the jury's right to
decide issues of law by judicial decision. 185 For example, the Massachusetts
legislature enacted a statute in 1808 giving the jury the right to decide both the
facts and law when rendering a general verdict.1 86 Although the precise effect of
the statute is unknown, judicial decisions in Massachusetts prior to 1840 generally recognized the jury's
right to decide issues of law in criminal cases notwith187
standing the statute.
88
In an 1804 seditious libel case in New York, People v. Croswell,1
Judge Kent not only affirmed the jury's right to decide issues of law in criminal
cases, but he also addressed a distinction increasingly made by people between
189
the jury's power to decide issues of law and its right to make such decisions.
In rebuffing the notion that the jury merely had the power to decide issues of
law, Judge Kent reasoned that
[t]he law must, however, have intended, in granting this power
to a jury, to grant them a lawful and rightful power, or it would
have provided a remedy against the undue exercise of it. The
181

Id. at 1119.

182

Id. at 1120-21 (emphasis added). For more information regarding the significance of Jus-

tice Wilson's instructions in Henfield's Case, see Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 377-79.
183 BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 907.
'8
Id. at 910; see Changing Role, supra note 10, at 174-76 (describing the jury's right to decide issues of law in Massachusetts). See generally Howe, supra note 24 (providing a detailed
account of the decline of the jury's right to decide issues of law in several states).
185
Brief History,supra note 5, at 910.
186 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 174.
187
Id at 175-76.
188
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
189 Id.; Farley, supra note 132, at 202-03 (describing the importance of the case).
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true criterion of a legal power, is its capacity to produce a definitive effect liable neither to censure nor review. And the verdict of not guilty, in a criminal case, is, in every respect, absolutely final. The jury are not liable to punishment, nor the verdict to control. No attaint lies, nor can a new trial be awarded.
The exercise of this power in the jury has been sanctioned, and
upheld in constant activity, from the earliest ages. 190
According to Judge Kent, the fact that the jury was given the power to decide
issues of law without reservation implied that the jury not only had the power to
decide issues of law, but the right to decide issues of law as well.
While the jury's right to decide issues of law was consistently recognized in America in the first several decades following the Revolution, the right
to jury review was considerably less clear, likely due in part to the infrequency
with which the right would be addressed in judicial proceedings.
Typically, any debate regarding the existence of the right would only arise when
an attorney attempted to argue the unconstitutionality of a statute to the jury. 191
92 which
The most famous of these early cases was United States v. Callender,1
involved the prosecution of James Callender for seditious libel against the President of the United States. 193 When William Wirt, counsel for the defense, attempted to argue the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act, Justice Chase immediately interrupted him and told him to take a seat. 194 Justice Chase told Wirt
that arguing the constitutionality of a statute "is irregular and inadmissible; it is
not competent to the jury to decide on this point ....
,195 An exchange between
Justice Chase and William Wirt ensued, in which Wirt attempted to convince
Chase that the jury's right to decide issues of law necessarily included a right to
decide the constitutionality of laws:
CHASE, Circuit Justice. No man will deny your law-we all
know that juries have the right to decide the law, as well as the
fact-and the constitution is the supreme law of the land, which
controls all laws which are repugnant to it.
Mr. Wirt. Since, then, the jury have a right to consider the law,
and since the constitution is law, the conclusion is certainly syllogistic, that the jury have a right to consider the constitution.
Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. at 366-68
191 AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98.
192 United States v. Callendar, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C. Va. 1800).
193 Id.; see also AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98-104 (analyzing Justice Chase's
arguments against jury review); Magliocca, supra note 22, at 204-07 (analyzing the case in the
larger context ofjury review in the early 1800s).
194 Callendar,25 F. Cas. at 252-53.
195
Id. at 253.
190
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196
CHASE, Circuit Justice. A non sequitur, sir.

Justice Chase believed that the right to jury review was "very absurd
and dangerous" and "has a direct tendency to dissolve the union of the United
States," affording jurors greater power over laws than those in the national legislature and leading to a lack of uniformity in the laws. 197 Ultimately, Justice
did not allow Wirt to argue the unconstitutionality of the statute to the
Chase
19 8

jury.

Some scholars have been quick to attack the theoretical underpinnings
and incoherent reasoning in Justice Chase's decision. 99 Notwithstanding these
arguments, Justice Chase's arguments likely had little de facto precedential effect due to the subsequent impeachment of Chase as a result of his conduct in
Callender and other cases. 200 Among the charges against Chase were that he
had tried "to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and
determine upon the question of the law, as well as on the question of fact, involved in the verdict they are required to give."'2 ' While the impeachment did
not directly concern his refusal to allow counsel to argue the unconstitutionality
of the Sedition Act in Callender,his impeachment undoubtedly called into question his handling of the Callender case specifically and his views of the lawfinding function of juries more generally.2 °2
Eight years after Callender,the right of counsel to argue the unconstitutionality of a law to the jury arose again in United States v. The William,2 °3 a
detertrial, Judge he
John
Davisdefense
theAct
Embargo
Act.2°4 Prior20 5tonevertheless,
case
allowed
the Embargo
to be constitutional;
minedconcerning

196

Id. (emphasis added).

197 Id. at 256-57. In fact, Justice Chase suggested that allowing the jury to decide the constitu-

tionality of laws would itself be unconstitutional. See id. at 257.
198

Id. at 257.

199 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 205-07; AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 98-

104.
200 Magliocca, supra note 22, at 205-07; see also Harrington, supra note 55, at 406-14 (providing a detailed account of Justice Chase's actions and his subsequent impeachment).
201
Articles of Impeachment, Art. I, § 3, in REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE
app. 3 (1805). Even though Justice Chase seemed to accept the jury's right to decide issues of law
in Callender, he narrowly interpreted this right to only include the jury's right to apply the legal
standards determined by a judge to a particular case, not the right to determine the law itself. See
Harrington, supra note 55, at 414.
202 See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 207. But see Pepper, supra note 21, at 627-31 (suggesting
that since the impeachment of Chase did not include any explicit criticism of Chase's refusal to
allow the jury to decide the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, this lack of criticism implied that
Congress tacitly agreed with his denial of jury review).
203
28 F. Cas. 614 (C.C. Mass. 1808).
204 Id.; Magliocca, supra note 22, at 195-96.
205 See The William, 28 F. Cas. 614.
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counsel to argue the unconstitutionality of the Act to the jury.2 0 6 Ultimately, the
jury found the law to be unconstitutional. ° More importantly, Judge Davis
discussed Callenderin his judicial opinion, including Justice Chase's denial of
the right to jury review.2 °s That Judge Davis allowed defense counsel to argue
the unconstitutionality of the Embargo Act to the jury, despite recognizing Justice Chase's decision to the contrary, implies that Justice Chase's views on the
right to jury review were not universally accepted by the early federal courts.
Even though the aforementioned decisions are far from conclusive on the issue,
they certainly do not foreclose the possibility that among the rights accorded to
these early
juries was an implicit right to determine the constitutionality of
20 9
laws.
B.

Tracing the Rapid Demise of the Jury's Right to Decide Issues of Law

Beginning in the early 1830s, federal courts began to question the settled proposition that the jury possessed a broad right to decide issues of law.210
At first, courts made minor shifts in their jury instructions that implicitly limited
the right. In United States v. Fenwick,21' the court instructed the jury that "[i]n
criminal cases, the jury has a right to give a general verdict, and, in doing so,
212
must, of necessity, decide upon the law as well as upon the facts of the case.,
In a more narrow formulation of the right, Judge Cranch declared in United
States v. Stockwel 213 that
the right of the jury to decide the law, was only the right to find
a general verdict which includes both the law and the facts of
the case. That the question whether one fact can be inferred

206

Magliocca, supra note 22, at 196.

207

Id.

208

See The William, 28 F. Cas. at 617

209

(The immediate question that the learned judge was then considering, was,
whether the power of determining the constitutionality of the law belonged,
exclusively, to the court, or whether it could be rightfully exercised by a jury.
His remaining observations, appearing in the published account of the trial,
more especially apply to that question).
See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 162-63 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (using United

States v. The William to support the notion that historically the jury had a broad right to decide the
law).
210
See Pepper, supra note 2 1, at 636.
211
United States v. Fenwick, 25 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C. D.C. 1836).
212
Id. at 1064; Pepper, supra note 21, at 636.
213
United States v. Stockwell, 27 F. Cas. 1347 (C.C. D.C. 1836).
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from another is a question of law, and to be decided by the court
214

If the jury's right to decide issues of law had been quietly chipped away
in the early 1830s, it was under direct attack in the 1835 case of United States v.
Battiste.1 5 Battiste involved a prosecution for violation of a statute that prohibited slave trading; since the parties did not dispute the facts of the case, the decision rested on the interpretation of the statute.21 6 In his instructions to the jury,
Justice Joseph Story acknowledged that when juries decide criminal and civil
cases, "their verdict, when general, is necessarily compounded of law and of
fact; and includes both. In each they must necessarily determine the law, as
well as the fact., 217 However, he made an important qualification: "In each,
they have the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the
court. But I deny, that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to
decide the law according to their own notions, or pleasure., 21 8 Instructing the
jury on its proper role, Justice Story declared that "[i]t is the duty of the court to
instruct the jury as to the law;
and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as
219
it is laid down by the court."
Justice Story justified his views of the proper role of the jury due to his
fear that if juries were to decide purely legal questions, it would lead to a lack of
uniformity and predictability in the law, as well as no remedy against errors
made by the jury. 220 He continued: "[B]elieving, as I do, that every citizen has a
right to be tried by the law, and according to the law; that it is his privilege and
truest shield against oppression and wrong; I feel it my duty to state my views
fully and openly on the present occasion. 22 ' Given the influence of Justice
Story's statements in Battiste on the future of the scope of the jury's law-finding
function, 222 it is important to realize how his justifications directly conflict with
the conceptions of the jury and judge at the time of the Revolution. 223 The
Founders did not fear that citizens' rights would be inadequately protected by
juries; rather, many feared that citizens' rights could not be trusted in the hands
of the government, and in particular in the hands of judges whose power was

214
215
216

Id. at 1348 (emphasis added).
24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C. Mass. 1835); see also Brief History, supra note 5, at 907-08.
See Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1042-45. For background information about the highly political

nature of this case, see Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 394-98.
Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043.
217
218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Id.

221

ld.

222

See Harrington, supra note 55, at 425-26.
See supra Part III.A.

223
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left unchecked by juries.
In support of this proposition, Akhil Amar noted the
differences in the restrictions placed on judges and juries in the Bill of Rights,
which suggest that the Founders were much more wary of judicial overreaching
than of jury overreaching. 22 While the theoretical underpinnings of Justice
Story's views may have been flawed, his decision undeniably signaled a major
shift in courts' attitudes toward the proper role of the jury.226
The attack against the jury's right to decide issues of law continued in
the 1851 decision in United States v. Morris. 227 The Morris decision arguably
went further than Battiste in limiting the right of the jury to decide issues of law;
moreover, the decision was significant because it concerned whether defense
counsel could argue the unconstitutionality of a law to the jury. 228 The case
involved the prosecution of Robert Morris for violation of the Fugitive Slave
Act.229 When defense counsel attempted to argue the unconstitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act to the jury, Justice Benjamin Curtis stopped him from doing
so, and he only allowed counsel to make the argument to the court outside of the
hearing of the jury.230 Thereafter, Justice Curtis denied that the jury had a right
to determine the constitutionality of laws, looking to the structure of the Constitution to conclude that Congress did not intend to empower unqualified individuals to decide constitutional issues but rather left that power to judges, who
were duty-bound by the Constitution to uphold the law and had to take an oath
to uphold the Constitution. 231 Justice Curtis went further in denying the jury's
right to decide any questions of law, declaring that
under the [C]onstitution of the United States, juries, in criminal
trials, have not the right to decide any question of law; and that
if they render a general verdict, their duty and their oath require
them to apply to the facts, as they may find them, the law given
to them by the court.232

225

AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 83-86.
See id. at 96-97.

226

See Harrington, supra note 55, at 425. Other federal cases denying the right of the jury to

224

decide issues of law include United States v. Riley, 27 F. Cas. 810 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1864); United
States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863); Stettinius v. United States, 22 F. Cas.
1322 (C.C. D.C. 1839); United States v. Shive, 27 F. Cas. 1065 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1832).
227
United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C. Mass. 1851).
n8
See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 207-09 (discussing the parts of the Morris decision concerning the right to jury review).
29
See Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 401-05 (providing a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the Morris trial).
230
Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1331; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 403.
231
Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1332.
232
Id. at 1336.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009

31

WEST
VIRGINIA
LAWIss.REVIEW
West Virginia Law
Review,
Vol. 111,
3 [2009], Art. 9

[Vol. 111

In dismissing decades of prior precedent to the contrary, Justice Curtis
incredibly hypothesized that the Georgia v. Brailsford decision affirming the
jury's right to decide questions of law may have been misreported.233 The Morris decision thus represented another push towards the elimination of the jury's
law-finding function; whereas prior cases had acknowledged the tension between the elimination of the jury's right to decide issues of law and the jury's
power to render a general verdict,234 Justice Curtis' opinion suggested that even
when rendering a general verdict, the jury had no right to decide the law but
rather must always apply the law given to them by the court.235
While federal courts were increasingly constraining the jury's right to
decide issues of law in the mid-nineteenth century, state courts and legislatures
were slower to follow suit. 236 Despite the inconsistency between states in their
recognition of the jury's right to decide questions of law, the general trend was
toward limiting or eliminating the right.237 In Massachusetts, for example, an
1845 supreme court decision declared that juries had no right to decide issues of
law, even though the right had been recognized in prior judicial decisions.238
The Massachusetts legislature responded by enacting a statute explicitly giving
239
criminal juries the right to decide questions of law and fact in criminal cases.
Within the same year, the Massachusetts supreme court decided a case in which
it interpreted the statute as merely a codification of the common law right 24to°
render a general verdict and not a right to decide issues of law more generally.
In Vermont, an 1849 supreme court decision affirmed the jury's right to
decide the law in a manner contrary to that of the judge, rejecting the reasoning
in United States v. Battiste.24' In this and later decisions, the supreme court reiterated the need for the right to ensure that the state's citizens were protected
from the undue bias of judges or oppression by the courts.242 By 1892, however,
the same court announced that the jury's right to decide questions of law was
contrary to the common law, the practice in Great Britain and the United States,
and the federal and state constitutions.243 All told, between 1850 and 1931 the
233
234

Id. at 1334; see Magliocca, supra note 22, at 208-09.
See, e.g., United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545)

(acknowledging the jury's power to decide questions of law when rendering general verdicts).
235 Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1336.
236 Harrington, supra note 55, at 425-26; see Howe, supra note 24 (describing inconsistencies
in the recognition of the right between states and the unevenness in the recognition of the right
over time within states).
237 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 425-26.
238 Changing Role, supra note 10, at 176-77 (analyzing Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10
Met.) 263 (1845)).
239
Id. at 183.
240
Id. (discussing Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1855)).
2A'
242

243

See State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849); Howe, supra note 24, at 592.
Howe, supra note 24, at 592-93.
State v. Burpee, 25 A. 964, 974 (Vt. 1892); see Howe, supra note 24, at 593.
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courts in at least eleven states rejected the right of the jury to decide questions of
law. 24
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sparf v. United
States245 effectively shut the door on the jury's right to decide questions of law
in this country. 24 In Sparf, the majority opinion relied heavily on the reasoning
of the lower federal court decisions in Battiste and Morris and found that even
though juries "have the physical power to disregard the law, ' 4 7 that "it is the
duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law
to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.' ' 248 In spite of the prevalence of court decisions to the contrary and the unsettled nature of the issue, the
Court declared that "the duty of the jury to receive the law from the court...
has become firmly established. 24 9 Moreover, the Court determined that such a
system was necessary to protect societal and individual rights from the unpredictability of a wayward jury.250 According to the Court, without the benefit of
a judge trained in the law to act as a buffer between the jury and the citizens,
"our government will cease to be a government of laws, and become a govern251
ment of men.,
Although Sparf did not specifically address the jury's right to decide the
constitutionality of laws, its reliance on Callender and Morris in support of its
denial of the jury's right to decide ordinary laws effectively doomed any right to
jury review as well.252 More generally, the decision undoubtedly played a role
in states denying the jury's right to decide issues of law.253 Only a few states
have ostensibly retained that right, but judicial decisions have all but eliminated
the practical effect of the right.254
By the end of the nineteenth century, the jury's right to decide issues of
law, expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Brailsford only
one century earlier, was effectively eliminated in both federal and state courts.
This dramatic shift occurred through a series of federal court decisions over the
244
245
246
247
248
249

Brief History, supra note 5, at 910.
156 U.S. 51 (1895).
Smith, supra note 4, at 452.
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 74.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 64. But see id. at 110-83 (Gray, J., dissenting) (reviewing historical cases and reach-

ing the opposite conclusion).
250
See id. at 102-03 ("Under any other system, the courts, although established in order to
declare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated from our system of government
as instrumentalities devised for the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essential rights.").
251
Id. at 103.
252
See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 209 (suggesting that the Sparf decision should have separated ordinary legal interpretation from questions of constitutionality).
253
See Wilson, supra note 45, at 398.
254

See Smith, supra note 4, at 453; Wilson, supra note 45, at 398.
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second half of the nineteenth century, which gained traction throughout the
country and ultimately with a majority of the Supreme Court Justices in rendering their opinion in Spaf.
V. AN INEVITABLE CONCLUSION? EVALUATING THE DEMISE OF THE RIGHT
OF THE JURY TO DECIDE ISSUES OF LAW IN LIGHT OF FOUNDERS' CONCEPTION
OF THE JURY

As Part IV.B illustrates, the erosion of the jury's right to decide issues
of law was relatively quick in light of the prominent place that the right held in
the country's struggle for independence. Given that the jury's right to decide
issues of law was arguably an integral part of the Founders' conception of the
* 255
jury,
one might inquire as to the explanations for this shift, and whether any
of these explanations serve as a justification for the drastic narrowing of the role
of the jury. A number of reasons were put forth by courts deciding the issue at
the time, including the
25625
Uneed for judges to protect citizens from the vagrancies of
an impassioned jury, the desire for uniformity in the interpretation of laws,2 57
and the structure of the federal government. 58 Scholars have also posited theories regarding the demise of the right, such as the professionalization of the
practice of law, 259 the waning distrust of judges, 26° and the diversification of the
jury pool. 261However, none of these explanations fully considered the larger
social and political roles fulfilled by the jury at the time of the Founding or how
the jury's law-finding functions comported with these roles.
The prominent federal court decisions of the nineteenth century that denied the right of the jury to decide questions of law shared much of the same
basic reasoning for reaching this result.262 One of the consistent themes across
several of the decisions was that the jury did not provide adequate protection for
the citizens in safeguarding their individual rights, and that the judge was necessary to intercede on behalf of the citizens to interject the correct law into the
proceedings.263 While this theory may have had elements of truth in particular
judicial proceedings, it completely neglected the Founders' conception of the
255

See supra Part III.B.

256

See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895); United States v. Battiste, 24 F.

Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835).
257
See, e.g., Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043; United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256-57
(C.C.D. Va. 1800).
258
See, e.g., Callender,25 F. Cas. at 256-57; United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 133133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
259
BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 915-17; Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
260
See Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
261
See ChangingRole, supra note 10, at 191-92; Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-36.
262
See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Callender,25 F. Cas. 239; Battiste, 24
F. Cas. 1042; Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323.
263
See, e.g., Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043; Spar, 156 U.S. at 102-03.
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roles of the judge and jury. 264 The Founders were not worried about the jury
subverting the citizens' rights; rather, the Founders realized the necessity of the
jury to protect the citizens from governmental abuses. 265 Nevertheless, judges in
this era declared that it was they who could most impartially mete out justice,
often adopting a paternalistic tone. According to Justice Curtis in his opinion in
Morris, "[W]hen a law, unpopular in some locality, is to be enforced there, then
comes the strain upon the administration of justice; and few unprejudiced men
would hesitate as to where that strain would be most firmly borne. 2 66 Apparently, Justice Curtis and the other judges who adopted this line of reasoning did
not grasp the irony that they were proclaiming judge impartiality while simultaneously making a decision that directly increased their own power at the expense of that of the jury.
Another argument put forth by judges denying the jury's right to decide
issues of law was the potential for a lack of uniformity in the laws if each jury
were empowered to independently interpret the law.267 Undoubtedly, uniformity
in the laws is a worthy aspiration; however, allowing lower court judges to interpret the laws and rule on the constitutionality of laws also leads to a lack of
uniformity throughout the country.26 8 Even though the Supreme Court may
have appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under federal laws or the Constitution, Congress also has the power to provide exceptions to this jurisdiction, and
indeed there was no avenue for Supreme Court review of the Callender case
itself.269 The structure of state judicial systems, such as Massachusetts in which
there were multiple judges each rendering their own interpretation of the law,
also undercuts the proposition that historically judges were in a better position
to provide uniformity to the legal system.27 ° More generally, the Founders conceived of a jury that would be an active participant in the administration of justice, and the trial itself would be used as a means of teaching the jury about the
law and the citizens' rights.271 Under this theory, once a jury became educated
in a particular area of law and received guidance from the judge, the jury should
be equipped to make a sound interpretation of the law. Even though jury service
is an infrequent event for any one juror, one could hope that juries could reach
determinations that were nearly as uniform as those of judges, since judges
would help educate the jurors on the law. Such a concept might seem foreign to
the modern reader, but perhaps that is only because the decisions made by legis264

See Changing Role, supra note 10, at 172 (describing the Founders' conception of the role

of the jury as protector against government oppression).
265

See id.

266
267

Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1336.
See, e.g., Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043; Callender,25 F. Cas. at 256-57.

268

See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 101-02.

269

Id. at 101.

270

See NELSON, supra note 135, at 28-30.

271

See supra Part Ifl.A-B.
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latures and judges curtailing the power of the jury have also largely eliminated
the education aspect of the judicial system.
In addition to the aforementioned reasons used by judges to deny the
jury's right to decide issues of law, judges who have denied the right to jury
review have pointed to the Constitution and the structure of the national government to infer that the right to decide the constitutionality of laws was to be
vested solely in judges.27 2 In support of this claim, judges looked to the fact that
federal judges must swear an oath to uphold the Constitution, whereas the Constitution puts no such requirement upon jurors.273 Furthermore, judges noted
that both the sheer importance of such decisions and the potential to negate legislative acts dictate that neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act should be
construed to give such an important right to juries, but rather to officers of the
judicial branch.274 It is striking that none of these arguments address which part
of the Constitution demands that judges decide the constitutionality of laws over
other federal officials who take an oath to uphold the Constitution, perhaps because there is no such evidence.2 75 Instead, the arguments seem to rest on a
more basic premise that because deciding the constitutionality of laws is important to the functioning of the country, the drafters of the Constitution and Congress certainly would not have left such a power in the hands of the jury. Again,
this premise fails to acknowledge that the Founders conceived of a jury as a
vital part of the democratic process, and arguably similar to a lower branch of a
bicameral judiciary.276 If viewed in this manner, both the judge and jury should
be able to act as a check on the legislative branch when it passes an unconstitutional law.277 Given that the Founders viewed the jury as a protector against
governmental overreaching, it follows that the jury should not only have a role
in protecting citizens from an incorrect interpretation of the law, but perhaps
even more importantly from an unconstitutional law itself.
Legal scholars have chronicled the demise of the jury's right to decide
questions of law; however, instead of analyzing whether this demise was warranted given that such a practice was commonplace at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution and was arguably a part of the Founders' conception of the
jury, scholars have instead focused on the practical circumstances that brought

272

See Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 256-57; United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331-33

(C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1333.
273
See Calender,25 F. Cas. at 255-56.
274
See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 99.
275
276

See supra Part IH.A-B; see also 3 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS

71 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861) (writing that trial by jury is "the only anchor ...
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.").
277
See AMAR's BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 93.
JEFFERSON
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about the change.278 Moreover, rather than question the propriety of the demise
of the right, scholars seem to suggest that it was an inevitable result of the maturation of American society. 279 According to scholars, one of the factors that
initially contributed to colonial juries deciding issues of law was that judges had
little formal legal training and the written law was not readily available.280 As
the nineteenth century progressed, the legal profession became more professionalized and the law became more complicated, and thus there was less desire for
juries to decide questions of law.281 Simultaneously, the distrust of judges presumably waned in the nineteenth century, lessening the need for juries to protect
the citizens from judicial abuses.282
While the aforementioned theory provides a practical explanation for
why the jury's right to decide issues of law declined in the nineteenth century, it
implicitly assumes that the distribution of authority in the early courts was a
result of convenience or happenstance, rather than a deliberate choice to give the
jury the right to decide issues of law. History shows that Founders with as disparate beliefs as Hamilton and Jefferson acknowledged that the jury's right to
decide issues of law was tied to its functions as a protector against governmental
oppression; 2 83 to suggest that the jury's right to decide issues of law had no relationship to the Founders' broader conception of the jury is simply a mistake.
Even if legal concepts became more complicated in the nineteenth century, that
circumstance alone should not preclude a jury from hearing a case. The Founders did not envision a courtroom in which the jury would listen to evidence and
make legal determinations on their own; instead, the judge was to play an integral role in educating the jurors on the law and providing them with the tools to
render informed verdicts. 2 4
Furthermore, the aforementioned theory relied on the fact that citizens
were less distrusting of judges in the late nineteenth century than at the time of
the Founding. Even if that fact is accepted as true, it does not negate the fact
that the Founders thought the jury to be such a vital institution because of its
ability to act as a check on governmental power. Just because the public opinion of judicial officers was generally higher in the late nineteenth century does
278

See, e.g., Howe, supra note 24, at 614-16; Brief History, supra note 5, at 915-20; Pepper,

supra note 21, at 639-40; Middlebrooks, supra note 26, at 408; Harrington, supra note 55, at 43536.
279
See Brief History, supra note 5, at 917 (suggesting that the increase in the technical nature
of the law, more extensive commercial transactions, and increase in efficiency in democratic
lawmaking in the nineteenth century may have accounted for a decrease in the need for juries to
decide issues of law).
280
See Harrington, supra note 55, at 378-79; Brief History,supra note 5, at 917.
281 See BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 915-17; Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
Pepper, supra note 21, at 639-40.
282
283

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part UI.B (analogizing the role of the jury to a lower branch in a bicameral judiciary, with the judge informing the jury of the pertinent law on the subject).
284
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not mean that there were no longer any biased judges on the bench.285 Indeed,
the Founders did not necessarily think that the majority of judges were prone to
abuses of power; instead, they wanted the jury to have the right to decide issues
of law to protect against the decision of a rogue judge.286
Another predominant theory espoused by scholars is that the narrowing
of the role of the jury, including the right to decide issues of law, was due in
large part to the drastic change in the composition of the jury pool. 287 Under
this theory, as the jury pool became more diverse and inclusive, the beliefs held
by the jury members likewise became more heterogeneous, and consequently
the verdicts became less uniform.288 As popular faith in the jury declined, the
judge interceded to provide uniformity and continuity. 289
While on its face this theory may go far in explaining the demise of the
right of the jury to decide issues of law, it raises many more questions about the
impact of race, gender, and socioeconomic status on the narrowing of jury's
rights. 290 An in-depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, 29' but the resolution of any of these issues is not relevant to whether the
narrowing of the jury's right to decide issues of law comports with the Founders' conception of the jury. The Founders thought of the jury as a majoritarian
institution-an arm of the popular government. 292 That the jury pool was becoming more "diverse" only meant that it was a more accurate representation of
the people. While it is understandable that judges might want to limit the ability
of the jury to use its power to subvert unpopular legislation,2 93 to wholly take
away the jury's right to decide issues of law strips them of the power needed to
neutralize equally oppressive judicial action.
Scholars have paid considerably less attention to analyzing the denial of
the right to jury review in the nineteenth century, perhaps because courts rarely
acknowledged the right to jury review in the first instance. Nevertheless, some
scholars have argued that the need for the jury to decide the constitutionality of
laws diminished once a truly democratic legislature was in place to ensure that
only constitutional statutes were enacted. 294 This explanation is flawed, howIn fact, one could argue that the judges who made decisions enlarging their own control over
verdicts at the expense of juries were precisely the kind of biased judges of which the Founders
were concerned.
286 See supra Part III.B.
287
See Brief History, supra note 5, at 916; Changing Role, supra note 10, at 191-92; Pepper,
285

supra note 21, at 640; Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-36.
288 See Harrington, supra note 55, at 435-37; BriefHistory, supra note 5, at 916.
289
290

See Changing Role, supra note 10, at 191-92, Harrington, supra note 55, at 437.
See generally Brief History,supra note 5, at 876-901 (describing the changing composition

of the jury).
291
For more information about this topic, see generally id. at 876-901.
292

See supra Part III.A.

293

See AMAR'S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 103.

294

Howe, supra note 24, at 615-16.
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ever, for it does not account for why judges still have the power to decide the
constitutionality of laws; if a democratic legislature could be trusted to always
pass constitutional laws, judicial review would also be unnecessary.
In a related vein, some scholars have theorized that the jury's right to
decide issues of law and the constitutionality of laws is part of the "recurring
cycle of rejection and return to law. 295 Roscoe Pound asserted that there are
moments in history when "more or less reversion to justice without law becomes necessary in order to bring the administration of justice into touch with
new moral ideas or changed social or political conditions. 296 During this reversion, new legal rules are developed, and over time the rudimentary forms of
justice are replaced by more uniform judicial action that is governed by the new
rules.297 It has been argued that late colonial America was one such revolutionary moment in which there arose a belief that the common man, through his
service on the jury, was able to understand legal and constitutional principles
and apply them to administer justice. 29 Once the growth in the body of law was
complete, more specific legal rules developed, and the need for the jury to decide issues of law diminished.2 99
The "recurring cycle" theory raises the point that there may be times
when the traditional methods for administering justice will not be sufficient to
meet the growing needs of society. However, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to predict when such a revolutionary moment will occur, and thus the "recurring cycle" theory might warrant the recognition of the right to jury review
so that the jury can send a signal to the other branches that constitutional reform
is needed. 3° In fact, it could be argued that the right of the jury to decide the
constitutionality of laws is more important than the right to decide issues of law
that do not have constitutional implications, because of the need to act in the
face of such a revolutionary moment. Indeed, an examination of the types of
cases in which the right of the jury to decide the constitutionality of laws was
implicated (for example, the Alien and Sedition Act3°land the Fugitive Slave
Act 30 2) lends support to the idea that such cases were potentially revolutionary
moments in which the jury needed to have such a right.
Neither the judicial opinions denying the jury's right to decide questions
of law nor the scholars' analysis of the phenomenon fully considered how that
right fit in with the Founders' conception of the jury. According to the Foun295
296
297

Brief History,supra note 5, at 918.
Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 699 (1913).
See id. at 696-706; Harrington, supra note 55, at 438-39; Brief History, supra note 5, at

918-20.
Harrington, supra note 55, at 439.
298
Id. at 439-40.
299
300
301
302

See Magliocca, supra note 22, at 216.
See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800).
See United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
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ders, the rights of the jury to decide questions of law and the constitutionality of
laws formed an essential part of the jury's arsenal to combat governmental oppression and provided it with the tools to be a central figure in the administration of justice and democracy as a whole. Limitations of these rights-whether
in the name of uniformity in the interpretation of laws, the greater expertise of
the judiciary, or the protection of citizens against potential unjust actions by
juries-are not in accordance with the Founders' conception of the jury at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and thus they are
arguably unconstitutional under Article 1H and the Sixth and Seventh Amendments as a deprivation of the right to trial by jury.
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